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^ui
ubcontract Agreement
Consisting

of this form and attachment

"A"

Treat Sys/Mech

Trade

842-1500-S

Job No.
J o b Name
THIS AGREEMENT made a t .

Salt Lake City

1st

.Utah. this.

_ day of _

Thlokol M-705
December

^9

88

by and between Interwest Construction Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Contractor, and .

A.H.

Palmer

& Sons

P L 0. Box_905
Logan', "UT "84321

(801)

752-4814

An independent Contractor In fact, hereinafter referred to as the Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators.
successors, and assigns jointly and severally firmly by these presents.
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor agree as follows:

1. SCOPE OF WORK
That the work to be performed by the Subcontractor under the terms of this agreement consists of the following:
Furnishing of all labor and material, tools, implements, equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, etc., to do all of the following:

Construction of the Strategic Waste Wa ter T^eajtmenit_PIant_7_M_il05
project as per plans and spec if_i cat Ions and general _cond_itjons prepared
"by Sverdrup Corporation dated" 9/15/88" Including addenda_#_l (1_1 /10/88 ) _
and addenda #2 (11 /11 /88 j for __the__fp 11 ow 1 ng_scope , of..work; DIvi s i on
11000-Treatment System; Less section 11040; Division i5o6o-Mechanica1,
less Section 15700-Flreprotectlon; Section 2740-Septic Systems; Section
2550-Slte Utilities; Section 10200-Louvers & Vents; Alternate A
ATt: If accepted deduct $31,328.00 for Tax"Exemption
Davis Bacon Act applies
A construction schedule will become Attachment "B" of this contract.
Construction schedule requires a six day work week and a minimum of
twelve hours per day & priority delivery schedules. The attached
letter is a part of this contract.
Subcontractor shall start no later than .

than

(as

(as d i r e c t e d )

. and complete his work no later

directed)

in strict accordance with the plans, specifications, and addenda as prepared by
.

Sverdrup

Corp/Morton

Thlokol

Architect a n d / o r Engineer, for the construction o f .

M-705 Strategic Waste Water Treatment Plant
Morton Thlokol, Inc.
For.
_, Owner, for
which construction, the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner; together with all addenda or authorized changes issued prior
to the date of execution of this agreement.
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construction regulations,
general and special conditions, plans and specifications, and all other contract documents, if any there be, insofar as applicable to this
subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described to be performed by the Subcontractor.
In the event of any doubt arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans and specifications the
decision of the Architect and/or Engineer shall be conclusive and binding. Should there be no supervising architect over the work, then
the matter in question shall be determined as provided in Section 8 of this agreement.
2.

PAYMENTS

'wnm i^iTOe* « r %T mw*ms tmrnm^v® «WMW!Pa r%m
s
f the-berein described work tbfi sum nf ..

1T555;900\00
^

~5Cr

0>

in monthly payments of .% of the work performed In any preceding month, In accordance with estimates prepared
the Subcontractor and as approved by the Contractor and Owner, or Owners Representative, such payments to be made as payments are
receivea ov tne uontractor irom me Uwner covering the monthly estimates oi the Contractor, including the approved portion of the Subcontractor's monthly estimate Approval and payment of Subcontractor's monthly estimate is specifically agreed to not constitute or imply
acceptance by the Contractor or Owner of any portion of the Subcontractor's work.
Final payment shall be due when the work described in this subcontract is fully completed and performed in accordance with the
contiact documents and is satisfactory to the arcrv'.ect.
Before issuance of the final payment the subcontractor, if required, shall submit evidence satisfactory to the contractor that all payrolls, bills for material and equipment, and all known indebtedness_connected^wi||i the subcontractor's work has been satisfied
This article 2. PAYMENTS is continued on atla

TflECEIVED

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms hereof by
affixing their signatures hereunto.
mftn

DEC 2 2 1900
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. '.
(Contractor)

_

,,-

iNrcnwsiT <:!)''•'•; i
Witness

fsJl<^Uu>^

A>Hj

PALMER & SONS
(Subcontractor).

D

nshh

Interwest Construction

SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
ATTACHMENT ' A"

2. PAYMENTS (com d)
In the event the Subcontractor does not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimates prior to the date of submission of the Con
tractor s monthly estimate then the Contractor shall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work performed during the preceding
month such amount as he shall deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the preceding month and the Subcontractor agrees to
accept such approved portion thereof as his reo lar monthly payment as described above
Subcontractor agrees to complete monthly I
elease and supplier affidavit forme supplied under separate cover prior to receiving .
Dayments under this agreement
^
Failure to comply with any of the conditions of this agreement constitutes cause for withholding payments until such time as this \)
condition is corrected to me satisfaction oi the contractor
The Subcontractor agrees to make good without cost to the Owner or Contractor any and all defects due to faulty workmansh p and i \*
or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents, and if no such oenod be stipulated in the » \ *
contract documents, then such guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion of the proiect_ The Subcontractor
further agrees to execute any special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract documents prior to final payment
In the event it appears to the Contractor that the labor material and other bills incurred in the performance of the work are not being
currently paid the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the money paid with any proqress
payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor material and all other bills incurred in the performance of the work of
Subcontractor The Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become due to the Subcontractor any sum or sums owing by the
Subcontractor to the Contractor and in the event 61 any bfeacn by the Subcontractor- 01 any provision or Obligation of this SuPcumrain-or
frytne event of the assertion by other parties ot any claim or lien against the Contractor or Contractor s Surety or the premises ar sing out /\
of the Subcontractor s performance of this Contract the Contractor shall have the right but is not required, to retain out of any payments 1
due or to become due to the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss damage or"
expense merefrom until me situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the sadsfact on of the Contractor ihesc
provisions snail be appucaoie even tnougn me subcontractor nas postea a mil payment and penormance uono

3. PROSECUTION OF WORK, DELAYS, ETC
The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work undertaken in a prompt and diligent manner whenever such work or any part of it
becomes available or at such other time or times as the Contractor may direct and so as to promote the general progress of the entire
construction and shall not by delay or otherwise interfere with or hinder the work of the Contractor or any other Subcontractor a n d j n
the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails to supply the necessary supervision labor and or materials tools implements"
equipment etc in the opinion of the Contractor and/or in the event me suocontractor is unable to perform oecause ot strikes pickeTTrro fL
or boycotting ot any kind which result in Subcontractor s employee s supplier s or subcontractor s being unable or unwilling to enter on [J
frTe |OQ ana complete me worn or in the event that me suocontracior or nis men reiuse to worx arter nav nq oeen reouesiea ov tne t o n
tractor to proceed with the work then the Contractor shall notify the Subcontractor in writing setting forth the deficiency and or delm
quencv and forty eight hours alter date of such written notice the Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of
the Subcontractor in full and exclude the Subcontractor Irom any further participation n the work covered by this agreement, or. at his
option the Contractor may take over such portion of the Subcontractor s work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the
Contractor and permit the subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work Whichever method the Contractor might
elect to pursue the Subcontractor agrees to release to the Contractor for his use only without recourse any materials tools implements
equipment etc on the site belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor for the benefit of the Contractor in completing the
work covered in this agreement and the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best of his ability and in the most econom cal
manner available to him at the time Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing any such portion of the work covered by this agreement
shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the terms of this agreement and in the event the total amount due or to
become due under the terms of this agreement shall be insufficient to cover the costs occurred by the Contractor in completing the work
then the Subcontractor and his sureties if any shall be bound and liable to the Contractor for the difference
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially upon the proper
workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcontractors on the proiecl the
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same in writing to the Contractor before pro
ceeding with his work which is so dependent ana shall allow to the Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such defects and in
the event he does not so report to the Contractor in writing then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work
of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully responsible thereafter for the satisfactory performance ot the work covered by this
agreement regardless of the defective work of others
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor all rubbish and debris resulting from his
work Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further payment to Subcontractor until such time as this
condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor Also he shall clean up to the satisfaction of the inspectors all dirt grease
marks etc from walls ceilings floors fixtures etc deposited or placed thereon as a result of the execution of this subcontract If the
Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by the Contractor the Contractor shall have the right and power to
proceed with the said cleaning and the Subcontractor will on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said labor plus a reason
able percentage of such cost to cover supervision insurance overhead etc
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against and collected
from the Contractor by the Owner which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor s failure to furnish the materials and perfoim
the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for herein regardless of the cause from which the delay
occurred and in addition thereto agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may sustain by
reason of such delay by the Subcontractor The payment ol such damages shall not release the Subcontractor from his obligation to other
wise fully perform thus Subcontract
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or use any por
tion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection and acceptance thereof by
the Owner but such use a n d / o r occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of said work and materials nor of his
obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which may occur or develop prior to Contractor s
release from responsibility to the Owner Provided however the Subcontractor shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such
portion of the work as may be used a n d / o r occupied by the Contractor nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole
negligence of the Contractor during such period of use
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work property a n d / o r materials until completion and final acceptance of the Contract
by the Owner and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance In the event of loss or damage he shall proceed
promptly to make repairs or replacement of the damaged work property and or materials at his own expense as directed by Ihe Con
tractor Subcontractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor s
work property or materials
It is agreed that the Subcontractor at the option of the Contractor may be considered as disabled from so complying whenever a
petition in Bankruptcy or the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him
f
J
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes toward the #*
\{2]
Owner i h e Subcontractor shall indemnity the Contractor and the Owner against and save them harmless irom any and all loss damage ^>
\ j f
expenses, costs, and attorney's fees incurred oi suffered on account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of this contracf
S u b c o n t r a c t s'-all pay reasonable and proportionate cost for hoisting services provideu oy Contractor

4. SURETY BOND
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish to the Contractor at the Contractor s request and expense a surety bond guaranteeing the
faithful performance of this agreement and the payment of all labor and material bills in connection with the execution of the work covered
by this agreement The bond is to be written by a surety company designated or approved by the Contractor and in a form entirely
satisfactory to the Contractor

5. PERMITS, LICENSE FEES, TAXES, ETC
The Subcontractor shall at his own cost and expense apply for and obtain all necessary fees permits and licenses and shall at no
extra cost to the Contractor conform strictly to the laws building codes and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the
project is being done insofar as applicable to work covered by this agreement
Subcontractor is an independent contractor in fact and also within the scope of the United States Internal Revenue Code the Federal
Social Security Act together with present and future amendments thereto and any and all unemployment insurance laws both Federal
and of any state or territory and is therefore solely responsible to the Federal State or territorial Governments for all payroll taxes deduc
tions withholdings and contributions under such laws The compensation payable to Subcontractor as above provided includes all sales
and use taxes and franchise excise and olher taxes and governmental impositions of all kinds and is not subject to any addition for any
such taxes or impositions now or hereafter levied

6. INSURANCE
The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain workmen s compensation insurance and to comply in all respects with the employ
ment of labor required by any constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in which the work is performed
The Subcontractor shall maintain such third party public liability and property damage Insurance including general products and
automobile liability as will protect it from claims for damages because of bodily injury including death or damages because of injury to or
loss destruction or loss of use of property which may arise from operations under this agreement whether such operations be by it or its

The Subcontractor agrees to furnish a complied certificate of insurance issued to interwest Construction Co Inc
The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against and save them harmless from any and all loss damage
costs expenses and attorney s fees suffered or incurred on account of any breach of the aforesaid obligations and covenants and any
other provision or covenant of this subcontract
Subcontractor shall indemnify save harmless and defend Owner and the Contractor from and against any and all loss damage in
jury liability and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons and all loss of or damage to property resulting directly or indirectly
from Subcontractor s performance of this contract regardless of the negligence of Owner or Contractor or their agents or employees
except where such loss damage Injury liability or claims are the result of active negligence on the part of Owner or Contractor or its
agents or employees and is not caused or contributed to by an omission to perform some duty also imposed on Subcontractor its agents
or employees
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory to Contractor
shall be maintained at Subcontractor s expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance being supplied by Subcon
tractor to Contractor) and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be notified by ten (10) days written notice
before cancellation of any such policy In event of threatened cancellation for nonpayment of premium Contractor may pay same for
Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or subsequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder

7. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS
The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement and any changes so made in the amount
of work involved or any other parts of this agreement shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes involved
and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor The Subcontractor agrees to
proceed with the work as changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work and pending
any determination of the value thereof
Subcontractor shall be entitled to receive no extra compensation for extra work or materials or changes of any kind regardless of
whether the same was ordered by Contractor or any of its representatives unless a change order therefor has been issued in writing by
Contractor If extra work was ordered by Contractor and Subcontractor performed same but did not receive a written order therefor Sub
contractor shall be deemed to have waived any claim for extra compensation therefor regardless of any written or verbal protests or
claims by Subcontractor Subcontractor shall be responsible for any costs incurred by Contractor for changes of any kind made by Sub
contractor that increase the cost of the work for either the Contractor or other Subcontractors when the Subcontractor proceeds with
such changes without a written order therefor
Notwithstanding any other provision if the work for which Subcontractor claims extra compensation is determined by the Owner or
Architect not to entitle Contractor to a change order or extra compensation then Contractor shall not be liable to Subcontractor for any
extra compensation for such work (As used In this Subcontract the term Owner includes any representative of Owner and Architect
includes the Engineer if any )

8. DISPUTES
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work the dispute shall be settled in
the manner provided by the contract documents If none be provided or if there arises any dispute concerning matters In connection with
this agreement and without the scope of the work then such disputes shall be settled by a ruling of a board of arbitration consisting of
three members one selected by the Contractor one by the Subcontractor and the third member shall be selected by the first two members
The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of their selected members respectively but the expenses of the third member
shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the arbitration in writing The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings
of any such boards of arbitration finally and without recourse to any court of law
9.

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT
In the event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion then the Con
tractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under this agreement prior to such termination will be
made as provided by the contract documents if such provision be made or if none such exist by mutual agreement or failing either of
these methods by arbitration as provided in Section 8
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
During the performance of this subcontract the Subcontractor agrees to not discriminate against any employee because of race
color creed or national origin As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 10925 of March 6 1961
as amended by Executive Order 11114 of June 22 1963 The executive orders and the respective regulations are made a part of this
subcontract by reference
Subcontractor shall also fully comply with wage hour and Equal Opportunity regulations and shall take vigorous affirmative action
including the submittal of a written affirmative action program to employ minority employees whenever so required—and is encouraged to
do so in the absence of such requirements
•
11. TERMS OF, LABOR AGREEMENTS
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract the Subcontractor is bound and will comply with
the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor is a party insofar as said labor agreements lawfully
require subcontractors to be so bound
12. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
The Subcontractor agrees not to sublet transfer or assign this agreement or any part thereof without written consent of the Contractor
As built drawings when required shall be accurately maintained by Subcontractor for his portion of the work and turned over to Con
tractor in an acceptable manner before final payment is made to Subcontractor
The Subcontractor agrees to provide his employees with safe appliances and equipment to provide them with a safe place to work
to perform the work under this contract In a safe manner with high regard for the safety of his employees and others and to comply with
health and safety provisions and requirements of local state and federal agencies including the Williams Steiger Occupational Safety and
Health Act and to hold the Contractor harmless for any costs deficiencies fines or damages incurred because of his negligence to comply
with these regulations acts and procedures

Subcontract Agreement
Attachment "A"

/*'*z?-ae_

Signed for Subcontractor
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poured the appeal to the court of appeals. We
then granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision affirming the trial court
judgment. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886
IN THE SUPREME COURT
P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995). Our present review is limited to
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, a Utah considering whether the court of appeals erred in
holding (i) that our decision in Beck v. Farmers
corporation,
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
Plaintiff and Respondent,
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict
v.
R. Roy PALMER and Val W. Palmer, dba liability arising out of the breach of contractually
defined obligations; and (ii) that Thiokol waived
A.H. Palmer & Sons,
itsrightsto enforce its contract with Interwest.
Defendants and Respondents.
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's
findings of fact. The trial court initially detailed
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba its findings by memorandum decision and then
A.H. Palmer & Sons,
by formal findings of fact and conclusions of
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light
v.
most favorable to the trial court'sfindings.State
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures v. A House & 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535
Company and fiberglass Structures (Utah 1994).1
Company, Inc.,
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest
Third-Party
Defendants
and entered into a contract under which Interwest
agreed to build a wastewater treatment facility
Respondents.
for Thiokol. Interwest subsequently
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, subcontracted with Palmer for labor and
fka Fiberglass Structures Company of S t materials in connection with the construction of
the facility. Palmer, in turn, subcontracted with
Paul, Inc.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc.
("Fiberglass Structures''), for the purchase of
v.
three fiberglass wastewater storage tanks for the
Thiokol Corporation,
facility. Palmer's purchase order required
Third-Party Defendant and Petitioner. Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans
and specifications unless it obtained prior
No. 940616
approval to deviate from them.
FILED: June 14, 1996
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the
treatment facility designated thefiberglasstanks
First District, Cache County
as T32, T33, and T34 and called for the tanks to
The Honorable Gordon R. Low
be built in accordance with "applicable
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national
ATTORNEYS:
voluntary industry standard governing the
Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt
construction offiberglasstanks. The tanks were
Lake City, for Interwest Construction
designed to collect wastewater from four smaller
George W. * Preston, Logan, and Robert T. tanks located inside the treatment building by
Wallace, Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & means of a gravity-feed system. Because the
Sons
tanks inside the building were smaller than the
John £. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard three external tanks, the gravity-feed system
and Fiberglass Structures
allowed the external tanks to become only
Anthony B. Quinn, Mary Anne Q. Wood,
two-thirds full at maximum. Thiokol approved
Richard G. Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for
specifications for the tanks indicating that their
Thiokol
walls would be 1/4 inch thick.
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated
Utah Manufacturers Association
fiberglass panels to the treatment facility site.
The panels were bolted together along vertical
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals seams to create each of the three tanks, and the
tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the
treatment building. The top of each tank was
This opinion is subject to revision before
bolted to the sides, andfillpipes were connected
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
between the three external and the four internal
tanks. The three external tanks were completed
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Following the trial court's entry of judgment and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial
on a contract dispute in favor of Interwest test that same day, tank T34 burst along one of
Construction ("Interwest") and A.H. Palmer and the vertical seams connecting two of its
Sons ("Palmer"), Thiokol Corporation fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2,
("Thiokol") appealed to this court, and we 1989, Thiokol inspected the treatment facility
UTAH A D V I C E REPORTS
Cheat
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and notified Interwest that the facility was
substantially complete with the exception of a
few punch-list items, which did not include the
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other
two tanks. The same day, Palmer gave Thiokol
a one-year warranty on all then-installed work.
Thiokol hired an independent consulting
engineer to review the cause of tank T34's
failure, and the consultant recommended that
Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant
was concerned about the strength of the tanks'
vertical panels, among other things, and
recommended increasing the thickness of the
panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design,
to 3/4 inch. However, Thiokors project
engineer directed the consultant to focus on
fixing the tanks' seams. Thereafter, Thiokol
negotiated separately and directly with
Fiberglass Structures for the repair of tanks T32
and T33 and replacement of tank T34; Thiokol's
involvement was such that the trial court
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures
"jointly constructed the tanks." Specifications
for the modified tanks clearly indicated that they
would have 1/4-inch-thick walls and a safety
factor of 6.
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and
accepted the repaired tanks on the basis of its
determination that the tanks met its
specifications. On June 13th, Fiberglass
Structures gave Thiokol an extended three-year
warranty at Thiokol's insistence, which
warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but
expressly excluded damage resulting from
modifications to the tanks. Interwest and Palmer
were minimally, if at all, involved in these
negotiations.
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the
treatment facility. Sometime that month, without
the knowledge of Interwest, Palmer, or
Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the
tanks' filling system from the original
gravity-feed design to an overhead,
high-pressure pump feed.
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured,
spilling its wastewater contents. The trial court
found that the pump feed system allowed the
tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol
employee. Given the pumping capacity, there
was an insufficient opening at the top of the tank
to allow for the escape of excess wastewater,
thus causing an uplift pressure which the tank
was not designed to withstand. The overfilling
and consequent uplift pressure caused the tank to
lift up from its concrete base and to split from
the bottom up along the middle of one of the
fiberglass panels, not along a seam as was the
case with tank T34's earlier failure.
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol
withheld $200,000 which it owed to Interwest
on the original contract. That amount included
$93,653.70 which Interwest owed to Palmer.
The instant action began when Interwest sued
Palmer for breach of warranty, negligence,
indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer then
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filed a third-party complaint against Fiberglass
Structures, which in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Thiokol. Interwest later added
Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Thiokol eventually counterclaimed against
Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass Structures for
breach of contract, breach of express and
implied warranties, negligence, and strict
liability.
After a two-week bench trial, the trial court
concluded in relevant part that (i) it would not
address Thiokol's tort claims because the case
was Entirely controlled by contract"; (ii) the
NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated
into the contract so as to specify a particular
wall thickness or safety factor for the fiberglass
panels and, therefore, Thiokol could not hold its
suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with
a specific wall thickness and safety factor; (iii)
neither Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass
Structures failed to comply with the contract in
any way which caused or resulted in the August
24th failure of tank T33; (iv) Thiokol failed to
prove the cause of tank T33's failure and the
most likely cause was Thiokol's overfilling the
tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the tanks
barred its recovery under any of its suppliers'
warranties. Accordingly, the trial court ordered
Thiokol to pay Interwest $200,000, ordered
Interwest to pay Palmer $93,653.70, and
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals
affirmed, and Thiokol's petition to this court
followed.
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends
that the court of appeals erred in affirming the
dismissal of Thiokol's tort claims. In addition,
Thiokol claims the court of appeals erred in
holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert
that the modified tanks should have complied
with the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol claims
that each of these issues presents only questions
of law which this court should review
nondeferentialfy. See State v. Penay 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's
tort claims. In its post-trial memorandum
decision, the trial court refused to address
Thiokol's negligence and strict liability claims
because it concluded that the case was uentirely
controlled by contract." The court of appeals
affirmed, reasoning that because "the contract
expressly provided that [Interwest and Palmer]
were under a duty to design, construct, and
deliver a product free from defects and suitable
for the purposes for.which it was to be used,"
their "responsibility in tort is . . . exactly
co-extensive with their contractual obligations,"
thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that
the court of appeals misconstrued our earlier
decision in Beck as establishing the proposition
that "if parties arrange rights, duties, and
obligations under a contract, any cause of action
for breach of those contractually defined
obligations, rights, or duties lies in contract, not
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in tort." Id. (citing Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-800). services for another owes a tort duty to the other
Although we ultimately reach the result that to perform such services with reasonable care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts
ThiokoFs tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokol Id. at 435-37; see
2
a4
the
that the court of appeals misapplied our holding §323 (1965). We explained that
in Beck. In Beck, we addressed whether an defendant's tort liability is not based upon
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith breach of contract, but rather upon violation of
and fair dealing allowed its insured to sue the the legal duty independently imposed as a result
insurer in tort. We held that ain a first-party of what the defendant undertook to do with
relationship between an insurer and its insured, relation to the plaintiffs interests.'" Id. at 437
the duties and obligations of the parties are (quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional
contractual rather than fiduciary." Beck, 701 Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions,
P.2d at 800. Because we found no independent 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 36).
We agree that a buyer of products or services
fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay may, in some circumstances, assert tort claims
claims, we further held, "Without more, a along with breach of contract claims against a
breach of [contractual] implied or express duties supplier. That recognition is nothing more than
can give rise only to a cause of action in an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have
permitted certain actions-for example, products
contract, not one in tort." Id.
Nonetheless, we specifically noted in Beck that liability-to include claims sounding in both tort
"in some cases the acts constituting a breach of and contract. See Keeton et al., supra, §92, at
contract may also result in breaches of duty that 660-61.
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of
are independent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action in tort." Id. at 800 n.3 Thiokors suppliers are necessarily "exactly
(giving examples). However, in Beck, we co-extensive with their contractual obligations,"
refused, for a number of policy reasons, see id. as the court of appeals held. Interwest Constr.,
at 798-801, to recognize a tort action in the 886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokol alleged that its
suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent
context of a first-party insurance relationship.
In the instant case, the court of appeals foreseeable harm to others (aegligeace) or
assumed on the basis of Beck that language in manufactured and sold the tanks in a defective
Thiokors contract calling for a product "free condition that made them unreasonably
from defects" supplanted any independent tort dangerous to others (strict liability). Our
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver decision in Beck does not control whether these
nondefective products or services. See Interwest tort claims can coexist with Thiokors contract
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. But the limitation we claims. That determination requires a deeper
adopted in Beck is not broadly applicable to all analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal,
contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred that analysis is unnecessary. We will take a
to a specific relationship between contracting shorter route and simply assume, without
parties. Each category of relationships must be deciding, that some tort and contract claims can
analyzed to determine, as a matter of law and coexist in the instant case.
policy, whether in that setting a party to a
In light of this assumption, we also hold that
contract owes any tort-type duties to the other the "free from defects" contractual provision
beyond the duties spelled out in the contract. cited by the court of appeals is insufficient as a
See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d matter of law to exempt ThiokoFs suppliers
413, 417-20 '(Utah 1986) (applying analytical from strict tort or negligence liability. On
model for determining whether tort duties exist); grounds of public policy, parties to a contract
see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and may not generally exempt a seller of a product
Keeton on the Law of Torts §92, at 655 (5th ed. from strict tort liability for physical harm to a
1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the user or consumer unless the exemption term u is
nature of the defendant's activity, (ii) the fairly bargained for and is consistent with the
relationship between the parties, and (iii) the policy underlying that [strict tort] liability."
type of injury or harm threatened to determine Restatement (Second) of Contracts §195(3)
whether tort obligations are owed in addition to (19&1). Wmle parties to a contract may
contract promises).
generally exempt themselves from negligence
Thiokol cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., liability, the language they use must "clearly
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), as an example of an and unequivocally' express an intent to limit tort
instance where we recognized that a tort duty liability" in the contract itself. DCR Inc., 663
may exist even when the relationship between P.2d at 438; see also Restatement (Second) of
Without such an
the parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR Contracts §195 cmt. b (1981).
ai
Inc., we allowed a clothing store owner to expression of intent, the presumption is
pursue a tort claim against a company which against any such intention, and it is not achieved
agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm by inference or implication from general
when the company knew but failed to warn the language such as was employed here.'" DCR
store owner that the alarm could be easily Inc., 663 P.2d at437 (quoting Union Pac. R.R.
deactivated by criminals. Id. at 434. We v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914
recognized that under those factual (Utah 1965)).
circumstances, one who undertakes to provide
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Accordingly, we hardly see how a contractual
promise to provide a product "free from
defects" amounts to an exemption from tort
liability, especially when we have refused to
enforce very detailed and thorough exculpatory
clauses that presented a much closer case for
exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's
strict liability and negligence claims were not
precluded by the existence of a contract which
contained a promise that Interwest and its
subcontractors would supply products "free from
defects." We thus disapprove of the reasoning
employed by the court of appeals to affirm the
trial court's decision.
We now address Thiokol's negligence and
strict liability claims on the merits. "To recover
for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the
defendant breached the duty, the breach was a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and
there was in fact injury." Jackson v. Righter,
891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995); see also
Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah
1993); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116
(Utah 1991); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,
726 (Utah 1985). To recover on a strict liability
theory against a seller engaged in selling
products of the kind at issue, a plaintiff must
prove (i) that the product was unreasonably
dangerous due to a defect or defective condition,
(ii) that the defect existed at the time the product
was sold, and (iii) that the defective condition
caused the plaintiff's injuries. Lamb v. B&.B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah
1993); see also Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152,
158 (Utah 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§402A (1965); Keeton et alM supra, §103.
Assuming, without deciding, that Thiokol's
suppliers owed it tort duties which they
breached, it is nonetheless axiomatic that to
successfully prosecute actions for negligence and
strict liability, the complaining party must prove
that another party's breach of duty proximately
caused the first party's injury. See Jackson, 891
P.2d at 1392 (negligence); Mulherin, 628 P.2d
at 1304 (strict liability); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts §281 (1965). Proof of
proximate cause is also required in breach of
warranty actions, which may sound in either
contract or tort. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.,
697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985); Mulherin, 628
P.2d at 1304; Hahn, 601 P.2d at 159.
"Proximate cause is '"that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence!] (unbroken by
an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker,
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alteration in
original) (quoting Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245^46
(quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482
n.3 OJtah \9UWY

Applying these principles to the instant case
and assuming that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort
duties which they breached, we hold that
Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same reason
that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to
prove that any defect in the design or
manufacture of tank T33 proximately caused the
August 24th failure. The trial court specifically
noted contrary testimony on causation: namely,
that Fiberglass Structures failed to properly
design, engineer, manufacture, or test the tanks
and that these failures contributed to the failure
of tank T33. However, the trial court ruled
against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim
because it found that Thiokol caused the August
24th failure by overfilling tank T33. We read
this as a factual determination that Thiokol's
misuse of tankT33 exceeded the fault, if any, of
its suppliers. Otherwise, the trial court would
have apportioned damages on Thiokol's breach
of warranty claim. See Interwest Constr., 886
P.2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages
on Thiokol's breach of warranty claim).
Accordingly, this finding also defeats
Thiokol's strict liability and negligence claims,
because they are premised on the same conduct
and resulted in the same alleged damages as the
breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co.
v. Structo-Ute Eng'g, Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 312
(Utah 1980). We thus disapprove of the
reasoning employed by the court of appeals to
affirm the trial court's ruling but affirm the
result reached by both courts.
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court
of appeals erred in holding that Thiokol waived
its rights to enforce the terms of its original
contract with Interwest with respect to the
repaired tanks. Thiokol insists that its original
contract with Interwest incorporated the
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69, a national
voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and
fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the
standard, and therefore the contract, called for
a wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch and a
safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified
tanks had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor
of 6 to l. 3
We first note that the trial court concluded that
the "NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not
incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with
sufficient clarity in the contract for the designer
and manufacturer to be aware of their
application; specifically with respect to wall
thickness and safety factors."
The court of appeals, in turn, initially
affirmed the trial court's finding that there was
no breach of contract because Thiokol's
suppliers "built and supplied the tanks in
accordance with the terms of the contract."
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. The court of
appeals then began its waiver analysis. The
court first noted, without analysis, that the
NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall
thickness dimensions and a safety factor of 10 to
1 and that the tanks did. not meet these alleged
requirements. Id. at 97 A nn.6-7. Then the
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court of appeals concluded that even if the to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate
contract incorporated the NBS standard, Thiokol wall thickness or safety factor requirements is a
had waived its right to insist that the tanks factual finding which Thiokol has not properly
conform to the wall thickness and safety factor challenged. Thiokol has attherefore failed to meet
the standard allegedly required. Id. at 98. The its burden on appeal to marshal the evidence
court reasoned that because Thiokol approved in support of the findings and then demonstrate
Fiberglass Structures' proposed design for that despite this evidence, the trial court's
remedying the defective tanks, supervised their findings are so lacking in support as to be
reconstruction, "and accepted the tanks although against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
aware that they were not constructed in making them clearly erroneous.'" Hall v.
accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol Process Instruments &. Control, Inc., 890 P.2d
waived itsrightto claim that the modified tanks 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995) (quoting A House &
were deficient because they failed to meet the 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4) (additional
design or construction specifications allegedly citation omitted). uAbsent such a showing, we
incorporated into the original contract. Id.
'assumeQ that the record supports the findings
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals' of the trial court and proceed to a review of the
waiver analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law
because (i) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was a and the application of that law in the case.'" Id.
material term of the contract which cannot be (alteration in original) (quoting A House & 1.37
waived; and (ii) an intentional waiver did not Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4).
occur because Thiokol never knew the tanks did
We first clarify the standard of review for
not meet the NBS/PS 15-69 specifications until interpretation of a contract. Determining
after the August 24th failure; and (iii) by whether a contract is ambiguous presents a
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and threshold question of law, which we review for
replace the three tanks after the first failure on correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v.
April 30th, Thiokol was merely permitting that Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770
supplier to cure its deficient performance, and (Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v.
Thiokors rights to demand full performance Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a
under the original contract. Thiokol notes that if contract is unambiguous, a trial court may
left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by review the court's interpretation for correctness.
deterring contracting parties from attempting to Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract
cure defective contract performance.
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol than one reasonable interpretation because of
and assumed by the court of appeals that the "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
contract incorporated minimum wall thickness other facial deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2dat
dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is
Thiokol concedes that the trial court expressly found to be ambiguous, a court may consider
found that the contract did not incorporate such extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. Id.
requirements but claims that the court of appeals Determining the meaning of a contract by
found that it did. Thiokol contends that the court extrinsic evidence generally presents questions
of appeals coujd do so because whether the of fact for the trier of fact, whose findings we
original contract incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69 review deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at
standard presents a question of law which an 358; see also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div.
appellate court can correct without giving of State Lands <k Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725
deference to the trial court's findings and (Utah 1990); John D. Calamari & Joseph M.
conclusions.
Perillo, Contracts §3-14 (3d ed. 1987).
However, both Thiokol and the court of
Applying the foregoing rules, we first look to
appeals have misconstrued the issue in this case. the four corners of the contract itself to
We do not read the trial court's finding as determine whether it is ambiguous. We conclude
rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 15-69 that while the contract unambiguously referred
standard into the contract, but as a finding that to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term
the standard did not mandate tank walls thicker requiring the tanks to conform to the "applicable
than 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1 so as requirements of NBS/PS 15-69" made the
to make these required terms of the contract. precise meaning of the performance intended by
Our reading is supported by the fact that the the parties ambiguous. * Applicable" is defined
trial court did consider whether tank T33 met as tf[f]it, suitable, pertinent, related to, or
NBS/PS 15-69's unambiguous requirement that appropriate; capable of being applied." Black's
"all layers shall be overlapped a minimum of 1 Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed. 1990). The word
inch" but found that Thiokol had not proven the "applicable" necessarily implies that (i) all the
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note requirements of NBS/PS 15-69 apply; (ii) some
3.
requirements apply while others do not; or (iii)
As we set forth below, under our reading, the none of the requirements apply. We must
trial court's finding that the contract's reference therefore review the NBS standard to determine
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whether any of its provisions unambiguously the court of appeals, and so that court should
mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a have presumed that the trial court's finding was
correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate
safety factor of 10 to 1.
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals court does not "'set aside the trial court's factual
that the standard does not unambiguously findings unless they are against the clear weight
mandate a particular wall thickness or safety of the evidence or [the appellate court] otherwise
factor for the tanks. The standard spans eighteen reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a
pages and covers materials, laminate properties, mistake has been made."* Sweeney Land Co. v.
round and rectangular ducting, reinforced Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990)
polyester piping, reinforced polyester tanks, (quoting Western Kane County Special Serv.
inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). "This standard of
of the standard states, "(MJinimum wall review applies equally to the Court of Appeals."
thickness shall be as specified in the tables . . . Id.; see also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
, but in no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 inch 199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals court
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating should have deferred to the trial court's factual
conditions." Turning to table 7, which specifies finding regarding the meaning of the contract in
minimum wall thicknesses for vertical light of its facial ambiguity and should have
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find presumed the correctness of the finding, given
that the table does not include dimensions for Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on
tanks greater than 12 feet in diameter, and tanks appeal.
T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals'
diameter. Table 7 also notes that its figures are waiver analysis was irrelevant and superfluous
*[b]ased on a safety factor of 10 to 1 . . . and a because it proceeded from an incorrect factual
liquid specific gravity of 1.2." The NBS assumption. In contrast to the court of appeals,
standard does not include a formula for the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different standard did not mandate a minimum wall
sizes than those included in table 7, for different thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a safety factor
safety factors, or for liquids with different of 10 to 1. A contracting party cannot be said to
specific gravities.
waive a term that was never part of the contract.
Moreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS Because the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not
safety
standard does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1 mandate a particular wall thickness or
tf
safety factor is "the recognized industry" factor, Thiokol could not waive these terms."
standard, contrary to the unsupported assertion However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol
that its suppliers failed to
of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886 cannot now claim
tf
P.2d at 97 n.6, or that this safety factor is adhere to these terms" and therefore breached
required in all fiberglass tanks. Other tables in their contracts.
the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and flanges
Accordingly, we are left with the trial court's
are based on different safety factors, and we factual finding that uthe tanks were built
have found no formula or recommendation pursuant to the design specifications mandated
regarding selection of a mandatory safety factor. by Thiokol in the contract," and the court of
Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically appeals' affirmance, based on that finding, of
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as the trial court's conclusion that there was no
merely stating the assumptions upon which its breach of contract. Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d
wall thickness specifications for standard-sized at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of that portion
tanks rest.
of the court of appeals opinion which held that
In short, the word "applicable" in the Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of
contract, coupled with the lack of specificity its original contract with Interwest but affirm
within the NBS standard, renders the contract that court's conclusion that there was no breach
ambiguous with respect to the thickness of the of contract.
tank walls and a specific safety factor without
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with
resort to extrinsic evidence. The trial court Interwest did not preclude Thiokol's claims for
apparently also found the contract provision negligence and strict liability but that those
ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration of claims fail as a matter of law because Thiokol
extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We
meaning. Whether the standard mandated a also hold that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's
minimum wall thickness and a safety factor of breach of contract claim, because the contract
10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial. After provision the court of appeals found Thiokol to
hearing the evidence, the trial court found as a have waived did not mandate a minimum wall
matter of fact that the contract, as drafted by thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a 10 to 1
Thiokol, did not impose the minimum wall safety factor as Thiokol claims. However, we
thickness and safety factor requirements that affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that
Thiokol claims were mandated by the NBS/PS Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract.
15-69 standard.
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in Harding concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's
support of the trial court's factual finding before opinion.
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Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the
result.
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon
does not participate herein; District Judge Ray
M. Harding sat.
1. These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court
of Appeals' opinion in this case. For a more complete
recitation of the facts, see Interwest Construction v.
Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 94-95 (Ct. App. 1994), cert,
granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13
(Utah 1995).
2. Section 323 of the Restatement provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is
subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the
risk of harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). We also
note that manufacturers and suppliers of products may
be subject to other tort duties even though thenproducts are sold via contract. See id. §§388-90
(pertaining to suppliers); id. §§395-98 (pertaining to
manufacturers); id. §402A (pertaining to strict liability
for defective products).
3. Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the
tanks' structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch
rather than the one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69
calls for and that the tensile strength of the tanks was
insufficient. However, the trial court specifically
rejected this version of the facts, finding that Thiokol
presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of
these points. Thiokol failed to challenge the trial
court's factual findings before the court of appeals.
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 96 ("Thiokol does not
challenge the trial court's factual findings."). We
therefore refuse to address them in this opinion.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah
1992). To the extent that the court of appeals recited
the trial court *s findings incorrectly, see Interwest
Constr., 886 P.2d at 97 n.7, we vacate that portion of
its opinion.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo——
Interwest Construction, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 940616

v.
R. Roy Palmer and Val w. Palmer,
dba A.H. Palmer & Sons,
Defendants and Respondents.
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer,
dba A.H. Palmer & Sons,
Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass
Structures Company and Fiberglass
Structures Company, Inc.,
Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.
Fiberglass Structures and Tank
Company, fka Fiberglass Structures
Company of St. Paul, Inc.*,
Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
Thiokol Corporation,
Third-Party Defendant
and Petitioner.

F I L E D
June 14, 1996

First District, Cache County
The Honorable Gordon R. Low
Attorneys:

Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake
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City, for Interwest Construction
George W. Preston, Logan, and Robert T. Wallace,
Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & Sons
John E. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard
and Fiberglass Structures
Anthony B. Quinn, Mary Anne Q. Wood, Richard G.
Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for Thiokol
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah
Manufacturers Association

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Following the trial court's entry of judgment on a
contract dispute in favor of Interwest Construction PInterwest")
and A.H. Palmer and Sons PPalmer"), Thiokol Corporation
PThiokol") appealed to this court, and we poured the appeal to
the court of appeals. We then granted certiorari to review the
court of appeals' decision affirming the trial court judgment.
See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994),
cert, granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995) , Our present review is limited to considering whether the
court of appeals erred in holding (i) that our decision in Beck
v, Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict liability
arising out of the breach of contractually defined obligations;
and (ii) that Thiokol waived its rights to enforce its contract
with Interwest.
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's findings of
fact. The trial court initially detailed its findings by
memorandum decision and then by formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light
most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v. A House &
1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1994) . f
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest entered into
a contract under which Interwest agreed to build a wastewater
treatment facility for Thiokol. Interwest subsequently

1

These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court of
Appeals' opinion in this case. For a more complete recitation of
the facts, see Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 9495 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol,
892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995).
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subcontracted with Palmer for labor and materials in connection
with the construction of the facility. Palmer, in turn,
subcontracted with Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc.
("Fiberglass Structures"), for the purchase of three fiberglass
wastewater storage tanks for the facility. Palmer's purchase
order required Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans
and specifications unless it obtained prior approval to deviate
from them.
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the treatment
facility designated the fiberglass tanks as T32, T33, and T34 and
called for the tanks to be built in accordance with "applicable
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national voluntary industry
standard governing the construction of fiberglass tanks. The
tanks were designed to collect wastewater from four smaller tanks
located inside the treatment building by means of a gravity-feed
system. Because the tanks inside the building were smaller than
the three external tanks, the gravity-feed system allowed the
external tanks to become only two-thirds full at maximum.
Thiokol approved specifications for the tanks indicating that
their walls would be 1/4 inch thick.
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated fiberglass
panels to the treatment facility site. The panels were bolted
together along vertical seams to create each of the three tanks,
and the tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the
treatment building. The top of each tank was bolted to the
sides, and fill pipes were connected between the three external
and the four internal tanks. The three external tanks were
completed and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial test
that same day, tank T34 burst along one of the vertical seams
connecting two of its fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2,
1989, Thiokol inspected the treatment facility and notified
Interwest that the facility was substantially complete with the
exception of a few punch-list items, which did not include the
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other two tanks. The
same day, Palmer gave Thiokol a one-year warranty on all theninstalled work.
Thiokol hired an independent consulting engineer to
review the cause of tank T34's failure, and the consultant
recommended that Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant
was concerned about the strength of the tanks' vertical panels,
among other things, and recommended increasing the thickness of
the panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design, to 3/4
inch. However, Thiokol's project engineer directed the
consultant to focus on fixing the tanks' seams. Thereafter,
Thiokol negotiated separately and directly with Fiberglass
Structures for the repair of tanks T32 and T33 and replacement of

3
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tank T34; Thiokol's involvement was such that the trial court
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures "jointly
constructed the tanks." Specifications for the modified tanks
clearly indicated that they would have 1/4-inch-thick walls and a
safety factor of 6.
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and accepted the
repaired tanks on the basis of its determination that the tanks
met its specifications. On June 13th, Fiberglass Structures gave
Thiokol an extended three-year warranty at Thiokol's insistence,
which warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but
expressly excluded damage resulting from modifications to the
tanks. Interwest and Palmer were minimally, if at all, involved
in these negotiations.
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the treatment
facility. Sometime that month, without the knowledge of
Interwest, Palmer, or Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the
tanks' filling system from the original gravity-feed design to an
overhead, high-pressure pump feed.
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured, spilling its
wastewater contents. The trial court found that the pump feed
system allowed the tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol employee. Given the
pumping capacity, there was an Insufficient opening at the top of
the tank to allow for the escape of excess wastewater, thus
causing an uplift pressure which the tank was not designed to
withstand. The overfilling and consequent uplift pressure caused
the tank to lift up from its concrete base and to split from the
bottom up along the middle of one of the fiberglass panels, not
along a seam as was the case with tank T34's earlier failure.
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol withheld
$200,000 which it owed to Interwest on the original contract.
That amount included $93,*653.70 which Interwest owed to Palmer.
The instant action began when Interwest sued Palmer for breach of
warranty, negligence, indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer
then filed a third-party complaint against Fiberglass Structures,
which in turn filed a third-party complaint against Thiokol.
Interwest later added Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Thiokol eventually
counterclaimed against Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass
Structures for breach of contract, breach of express and implied
warranties, negligence, and strict liability.
After a two-week bench trial, the trial court concluded
in relevant part that (i) it would not address Thiokol's tort
claims because the case was "entirely controlled by contract";
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(ii) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated into the
contract so as to specify a particular wall thickness or safety
factor for the fiberglass panels andf therefore, Thiokol could
not hold its suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with a
specific wall thickness and safety factor; (iii) neither
Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass Structures failed to comply
with the contract in any way which caused or resulted in the
August 24th failure of tank T33; (iv) Thiokol failed to prove the
cause of tank T33's failure and the most likely cause was
Thiokol's overfilling the tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the
tanks barred its recovery under any of its suppliers' warranties.
Accordingly, the trial court ordered Thiokol to pay Interwest
$200,000, ordered Interwest to pay Palmer $93,653.70, and
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals affirmed, and
Thiokol's petition to this court followed.
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends that the
court of appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Thiokol' s
tort claims. In addition, Thiokol claims the court of appeals
erred in holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert that the
modified tanks should have complied with the NBS/PS 15-69
standard. Thiokol claims that each of these issues presents only
questions of law which this court should review nondeferentially.
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's tort
claims. In its post-trial memorandum decision, the trial court
refused to address Thiokol's negligence and strict liability
claims because it concluded that the case was "entirely
controlled by contract." The court of appeals affirmed,
reasoning that because "the contract expressly provided that
[Interwest and Palmer] were under a duty to design, construct,
and deliver a product free from defects and suitable for the
purposes for which it was to be used," their "responsibility in
tort is . . . exactly co-extensive with their contractual
obligations," thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that the court of
appeals misconstrued our earlier decision in Beck as establishing
the proposition that "if parties arrange rights, duties, and
obligations under a contract, any cause of action for breach of
those contractually defined obligations, rights, or duties lies
in contract, not in tort." Id^ (citing Beck, 701 P.2d at 799800).
Although we ultimately reach the result that Thiokol's
tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokol that the court of appeals
misapplied our holding in Beck. In Beck, we addressed whether an
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
allowed its insured to sue the insurer in tort. We held that "in
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a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured,
the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather
than fiduciary." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800. Because we found no
independent fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay claims, we
further held, ""Without more, a breach of [contractual] implied or
express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in
contract, not one in tort*" T H
Nonetheless, we specifically noted in Beck that *in
some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also
result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract
and may give rise to causes of action in tort." Id. at 800 n.3
(giving examples)* However, in Beck, we refused, for a number of
policy reasons, see id. at 798-801, to recognize a tort action In
the context of a first-party insurance relationship.
In the instant case, the court of appeals assumed on
the basis of Beck that language in Thiokol's contract calling for
a product ™free from defects" supplanted any independent tort
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver nondefective
products or services. See Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101*
But the limitation we adopted in Beck is not broadly applicable
to all contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred to a
specific relationship between contracting parties. Each category
of relationships must be analyzed to determine, as a matter of
law and policy, whether in that setting a party to a contract
owes any tort-type duties to the other beyond the duties spelled
out in the contract. See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726
P.2d 413, 417-20 (Utah 1986) (applying analytical model for
determining whether tort duties exist); see also W. Page Keeton
et al#
' Grosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, at 655 (5th
ed. 1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the nature of
the defendant's activity, (ii) the relationship between the
parties, and (iii) the type of injury or harm threatened to
determine* whether tort obligations are owed i n addition l:o
contract promises),
Thiokol cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433
(Utah 1983), as an example of an instance where we recognized
that a tort duty may exist even when the relationship between the
parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR Inc., we allowed a
clothing store owner to pursue a tort claim against a company
which agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm when the
company knew but failed to warn the store owner that the alarm
could be easily deactivated by criminals. IdL^ at 434. We
recognized that under those factual circumstances, one who
undertakes to provide services for another owes a tort duty to
the other to perform such services with reasonable care. Id. at
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435-37; see Restatement (SJecond) of Torts § 323 (1965) .2 We
explained that M *the defendant's tort liability is not based upon
breach of contract, but rather upon violation of the legal duty
independently imposed as a result of what the defendant undertook
to do with relation to the plaintiff's interests•'" Id^ at 437
(quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in
the Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 36) .
We agree that a buyer of products or services may, in
some circumstances, assert tort claims along with breach of
contract claims against a supplier. That recognition is nothing
more than an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have
permitted certain actions—for example, products liability—to
include claims sounding in both tort and contract. See Keeton et
al., supra, § 92, at 660-61.
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of Thiokol's
suppliers are necessarily ^exactly co-extensive with their
contractual obligations," as the court of appeals held.
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokol alleged that
its suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent
foreseeable harm to others (negligence) or manufactured and sold
the tanks in a defective condition that made them unreasonably
dangerous to others (strict liability). Our decision in Beck
does not control whether these tort claims can coexist with
Thiokol's contract claims. That determination requires a deeper
analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal, that analysis is

2

Section 323 of the Restatement provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of
the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) . We also note that
manufacturers and suppliers of products may be subject to other
tort duties even though their products are sold via contract.
See id. §§ 388-90 (pertaining to suppliers); id^ §§ 395-98
(pertaining to manufacturers); id^ § 402A (pertaining to strict
liability for defective products).
No. 940616
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unnecessary. We will take a shorter route and simply assume,
without deciding, that some tort and contract claims can coexist
in the instant case.
In light of this assumption, we also hold that the
*free from defects" contractual provision cited by the court of
appeals is insufficient as a matter of law to exempt Thiokol's
suppliers from strict tort or negligence liability. On grounds
of public policy, parties to a contract may not generally exempt
a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical
harm to a user or consumer unless the exemption term *is fairly
bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that
[strict tort] liability." Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 195(3) (1981). While parties to a contract may generally
exempt themselves from negligence liability, the language they
use must **clearly and unequivocally' express an intent to limit
tort liability" in the contract itself.
DCR Inc., 663 P.2d at
438/ see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 cmt. b
(1981). Without such an expression of intent, *xthe presumption
is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by
inference or implication from general language such as was
employed here.'" DCR Inc., 663 P.2d at 437 (quoting Union Pac.
R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965)).
Accordingly, we hardly see how a contractual promise to
provide a product *free from defects" amounts to an exemption
from tort liability, especially when we have refused to enforce
very detailed and thorough exculpatory clauses that presented a
much closer case for exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's strict liability
and negligence claims were not precluded by the existence of a
contract which contained a promise that Interwest and its
subcontractors would supply products *free from defects." We
thus disapprove of the reasoning employed by the court of appeals
to affirm the trial court's decision.
We now address Thiokol's negligence and strict
liability claims on the merits. *To recover for negligence, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty,
the defendant breached the duty, the breach was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries, and there was in fact injury."
Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995); see also
Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); Reeves v.
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991); Williams v. Melby, 699
P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). To recover on a strict liability
theory against a seller engaged in selling products of the kind
at issue, a plaintiff must prove (i) that the product was
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition,
(ii) that the defect existed at the time the product was sold,
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and (iii) that the defective condition caused the plaintiff's
injuries. Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp,, 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah
1993); see also Mulherin v. Ingersoil-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301/
1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W. Hahnr Inc. v. Armco Steel Co,, 601
P.2d 152# 158 (Utah 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
(1965); Keeton et al., supra/ § 103,
Assuming/ without deciding/ that Thiokol's suppliers
owed it tort duties which they breached/ it is nonetheless
axiomatic that to successfully prosecute actions for negligence
and strict liability/ the complaining party must prove that
another party' s breach of duty proximately caused the first
party's injury. See Jackson/ 891 P.2d at 1392 (negligence);
Mulherin# 628 P.2d at 1304 (strict liability); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965). Proof of proximate
cause is also required in breach of warranty actions/ which may
sound in either contract or tort. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters./
697 P.2d 240/ 247 (Utah 1985); Mulherin/ 628 P.2d at 1304; Hahn#
601 P.2d at 159. "Proximate cause is **that cause which/ in
natural and continuous sequence!] (unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause)/ produces the injury/ and without which the
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433f 439
(Utah 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell/ 697 P.2d
at 245-46 (quoting State v. Lawson/ 688 P.2d 479# 482 n.3 (Utah
1984))).
Applying these principles to the instant case and
assuming that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort duties which they
breached/ we hold that Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same
reason that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to prove
that any defect in the design or manufacture of tank T33
proximately caused the August 24th failure. The trial court
specifically noted contrary testimony on causation: namely, that
Fiberglass Structures failed to properly design, engineer,
manufacture/ or test the tanks and that these failures
contributed to the failure of tank T33. However, the trial court
ruled against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim because it
found that Thiokol caused the August 24th failure by overfilling
tank T33. We read this as a factual determination that Thiokol's
misuse of tank T33 exceeded the fault/ if any# of its suppliers.
Otherwise/ the trial court would have apportioned damages on
Thiokol's breach of warranty claim. See Interwest Constr./ 886
P.2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages on Thiokol's breach
of warranty claim) •
Accordingly/ this finding also defeats Thiokol's strict
liability and negligence claims, because they are premised on the
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same conduct and resulted in the same alleged damages as the
breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co* v. Structo-Lite
Eng'g, Inc./ 619 P.2d 306, 312 (Utah 1980). We thus disapprove
of the reasoning employed by the court of appeals to affirm the
trial court's ruling but affirm the result reached by both
courts.
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Thiokol waived its rights to
enforce the terms of its original contract with Interwest with
respect to the repaired tanks. Thiokol insists that its original
contract with Interwest incorporated the requirements of NBS/PS
15-69, a national voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and
fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the standard, and
therefore the contract/ called for a wall thickness greater than
1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified tanks
had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 6 to I.3
We first note that the trial court concluded that the
*NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not incorporated into the contract
by Thiokol with sufficient clarity in the contract for the
designer and manufacturer to be aware of their application;
specifically with respect to wall thickness and safety factors."
The court of appeals, in turn, initially affirmed the
trial court's finding that there was no breach of contract
because Thiokol's suppliers *built and supplied the tanks in
accordance with the terms of the contract." Interwest Constr.,
886 P.2d at 97. The court of appeals then began its waiver
analysis. The court first noted, without analysis, that the
NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall thickness dimensions
and a safety factor of 10 to 1 and that the tanks did not meet
these alleged requirements. Id. at 97 & nn.6-7. Then the court

3

Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the tanks'
structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch rather than the
one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69 calls for and that the tensile
strength of the tanks was insufficient. However, the trial court
specifically rejected this version of the facts, finding that
Thiokol presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of these
points. Thiokol failed to challenge the trial court's factual
findings before the court of appeals. Interwest Constr., 886
P.2d at 96 (^Thiokol does not challenge the trial court's factual
findings."). We therefore refuse to address them in this
opinion. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992).
To the extent that the court of appeals recited the trial court's
findings incorrectly, see Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97 n.7,
we vacate that portion of its opinion.
No. 940616
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of appeals concluded that even if the contract incorporated the
NBS standard, Thiokol had waived its right to insist that the
tanks conform to the wall thickness and safety factor the
standard allegedly required. Id, at 98, The court reasoned that
because Thiokol approved Fiberglass Structures' proposed design
for remedying the defective tanks, supervised their
reconstruction, nand accepted the tanks although aware that they
were not constructed in accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol
waived its right to claim that the modified tanks were deficient
because they failed to meet the design or construction
specifications allegedly incorporated into the original contract.
Id.
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals' waiver
analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny because (i) the NBS/PS 1569 standard was a material term of the contract which cannot be
waived; and (ii) an intentional waiver did not occur because
Thiokol never knew the tanks did not meet the NBS/PS 15-69
specifications until after the August 24th failure; and (iii) by
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and replace the three
tanks after the first failure on April 30th, Thiokol was merely
permitting that supplier to cure its deficient performance, and
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate Thiokol's rights
to demand full performance under the original contract. Thiokol
notes that if left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by deterring
contracting parties from attempting to cure defective contract
performance.
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol and assumed
by the court of appeals that the contract incorporated minimum
wall thickness dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol concedes
that the trial court expressly found that the contract did not
incorporate such requirements but claims that the court of
appeals found that it di<J. Thiokol contends that the court of
appeals could do so because whether the original contract
incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69 standard presents a question of law
which an appellate court can correct without giving deference to
the trial court's findings and conclusions.
However, both Thiokol and the court of appeals have
misconstrued the issue in this case. We do not read the trial
court's finding as rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 1569 standard into the contract, but as a finding that the standard
did not mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a safety
factor of 10 to 1 so as to make these required terms of the
contract. Our reading is supported by the fact that the trial
court did consider whether tank T33 met NBS/PS 15-69's
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unambiguous requirement that *all layers shall be overlapped a
minimum of 1 inch" but found that Thiokol had not proven the
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note 3.
As we set forth below, under our reading, the trial
court's finding that the contract's reference to the NBS/PS 15-69
standard did not mandate wall thickness or safety factor
requirements is a factual finding which Thiokol has not properly
challenged, Thiokol has therefore failed to meet its burden on
appeal to *^marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'"
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1028
(Utah 1995) (quoting A House & 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4)
(additional citation omitted). ^Absent such a showing, we
*assume[] that the record supports the findings of the trial
court and proceed to a review of the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case,"* Id. (alteration in original) (quoting A House & 1.37
Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4).
We first clarify the standard of review for
interpretation of a contract. Determining whether a contract is
ambiguous presents a threshold question of law, which we review
for correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp.,
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d
356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a contract is unambiguous, a trial
court may interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we
review the court's interpretation for correctness. Willard
Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract provision is ambiguous if it
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
"uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292*, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is
found to be ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to
determine its meaning. Id. Determining the meaning of a
contract by extrinsic evidence generally presents questions of
fact for the trier of fact, whose findings we review
deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at 358; see also Plateau
Mining Co. v. Utah Pi v. of State Lands & Forestry/ 802 P.2d 720,
725 (Utah 1990); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts
§ 3-14 (3d ed. 1987).
Applying the foregoing rules, we first look to the four
corners of the contract itself to determine whether it is
ambiguous. We conclude that while the contract unambiguously
referred to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term requiring the
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tanks to conform to the "applicable requirements of NBS/PS 15-69"
made the precise meaning of the performance intended by the
parties ambiguous. "Applicable" is defined as "[f]it, suitable,
pertinent, related to, or appropriate; capable of being applied,"
Black#s Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed, 1990). The word "applicable"
necessarily implies that (i) all the requirements of NBS/PS 15-69
apply; (ii) some requirements apply while others do not; or
(iii) none of the requirements apply. We must therefore review
the NBS standard to determine whether any of its provisions
unambiguously mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a
safety factor of 10 to 1.
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals that the
standard does not unambiguously mandate a particular wall
thickness or safety factor for the tanks. The standard spans
eighteen pages and covers materials, laminate properties, round
and rectangular ducting, reinforced polyester piping, reinforced
polyester tanks, inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6 of the standard
states, "[M]inimum wall thickness shall be as specified in the
tables . . . , but in no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 inch
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating conditions." Turning
to table 7, which specifies minimum wall thicknesses for vertical
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find that the
table does not include dimensions for tanks greater than 12 feet
in diameter, and tanks T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in
diameter. Table 7 also notes that its figures are "[biased on a
safety factor of 10 to 1 . . . and a liquid specific gravity of
1.2." The NBS standard does not include a formula for
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different sizes than
those included in table 7, for different safety factors, or for
liquids with different specific gravities.
Mdreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS standard
does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1 safety factor is "the
recognized industry" standard, contrary to the unsupported
assertion of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at
97 n.6, or that this safety factor is required in all fiberglass
tanks. Other tables in the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and
flanges are based on different safety factors, and we have found
no formula or recommendation regarding selection of a mandatory
safety factor. Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as merely stating the
assumptions upon which its wall thickness specifications for
standard-sized tanks rest.
In short, the word "applicable" in the contract,
coupled with the lack of specificity within the NBS standard,
renders the contract ambiguous with respect to the thickness of
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the tank walls and a specific safety factor without resort to
extrinsic evidence. The trial court apparently also found the
contract provision ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration
of extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's meaning. Whether
the standard mandated a minimum wall thickness and a safety
factor of 10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial* After hearing
the evidence, the trial court found as a matter of fact that the
contract, as drafted by Thiokol, did not impose the minimum wall
thickness and safety factor requirements that Thiokol claims were
mandated by the NBS/PS 15-69 standard.
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's factual finding before the court of appeals,
and so that court should have presumed that the trial court's
finding was correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate court
does not *^set aside the trial court's factual findings unless
they are against the clear weight of the evidence or [the
appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Sweeney Land Co. v.
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990} (quoting Western Kane
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d
1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). *This standard of review applies
equally to the Court of Appeals." Id.; see also Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals
court should have deferred to the trial court's factual finding
regarding the meaning of the contract in light of its facial
ambiguity and should have presumed the correctness of the
finding, given Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on
appeal.
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' waiver
analysis was irrelevant and superfluous because it proceeded from
an incorrect factual assumption. In contrast to the court of
appeals, the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did
not mandate a minimum wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a
safety factor of 10 to 1* A contracting party cannot be said to
waive a term that was never part of the contract. Because the
NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate a particular wall thickness
or safety factor, Thiokol could not waive these *terms."
However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol cannot now claim that
its suppliers failed to adhere to these *terms" and therefore
breached their contracts.
Accordingly, we are left with the trial court's factual
finding that *the tanks were built pursuant to the design
specifications mandated by Thiokol in the contract," and the
court of appeals' affirmance, based on that finding, of the trial
court's conclusion that there was no breach of contract.
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of
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that portion of the court of appeals opinion which held that
Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of its original
contract with Interwest but affirm that court's conclusion that
there was no breach of contract.
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with Interwest
did not preclude Thiokol's claims for negligence and strict
liability but that those claims fail as a matter of law because
Thiokol caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We also hold
that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's breach of contract
claim, because the contract provision the court of appeals found
Thiokol to have waived did not mandate a minimum wall thickness
greater than 1/4 inch or a 10 to 1 safety factor as Thiokol
claims. However, we affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that
Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract.

Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge Harding concur
in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the result.
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon does not
participate herein; District Judge Ray M. Harding sat.
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WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8
9

INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

10
11
12
13

vs.
R. ROY PALMER and VAL W.
PALMER, d.b.a. A. H. PALMER
& SONS,

16

Civil No

• :_tol

Defendants.

14
15

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff complains of the Defendant and for cause of
action alleges as follows:

17

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

18

1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation which maintains

19

its principal pla<*~ ~^ business in Salt Lake County, State

20

of Utah,

21
22
23

2.

Defendants **re residents of Cache County, State of

Utah.
3.

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Morton

24

Thiokol Inc. ("Thiokol") under which Plaintiff agreed to

25

construct a waste water treatment facility (the "Treatment

26

Plant") for Thiokol.

27
28
W A L S T A D 8L B A B C O C K A T T O R N E Y S & C O U N S E L O R S AT LAW

'

4.

On or about December 1, 1988, Defendants entered

into a Subcontract Agreement with Plaintiff by which
Defendants agreed to perform labor and provide materials for
4

the construction of the Treatment Plant.

^

Subcontract Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and

®

incorporated herein.

'
°

5.

A copy of the

Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants

supplied, among other things, three fiberglass waste water

** I storage tanks that were installed in the Treatment Plant.
10

6.

On or about August 24, 1989 one of the tanks

11

supplied by Defendants failed and released approximately

12

32,000 gallons of water causing damage to the Treatment

13

Plant.

14

7.

At the time the tank failed an$ at the time of the

15

filing of this Complaint, Thiokol was and is indebted to

16

Plaintiff an amount exceeding $229,000.00 pursuant to th«

^'

construction agreement mentioned above of which $93,000.00

18

was owed to Defendants leaving a balance due Plaintiff of

19

20

$136*, 000.00.
8.

Thiokol "Was refused to pay the balance due to

21

Plaintiff because of the damages Thiokol alleges that it

22

suffered as a result of the failure of the tank.

23
24
25

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
9.

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

26
27
28
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'I
2

10. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants
are obligated to:

3

*L

make good without cost to [Thiokol] and
[Plaintiff ] any and all defects due to faulty
w o r k m a n s h i p and or materials which may appear
within . . . one year from date of completion of
the [Treatment Plant]

6 I

l i . Defendants have failed and refused to comply with

11

the terms of the express warranty of their work set forth in

4

..

the
9

Subcontract

Agreement which has resulted

in the

withholding of the payment by Thiokol^

'0

12#

^

Plaintiff

Defendants, jointly

is

entitled

and

to

severally,

judgment
in the

against

amount of

£ I $136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal
13

rate from August 2 4 , 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's
II * *

^ || c&sts incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys 1 fees.
\ j
1
/

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
13.

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

° J'
1 4 . Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants
19
are obligated to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from
20
any costs, losses or claims that may in any way arise out of
21
the Defendants 1 performance under the Subcontract Agreement.
22
15. Defendants have failed and refused to indemnify
23
and hold Plaintiff harmless of loss in accordance with the
24
terms of the Subcontract Agreement which has resulted in the
25
withholding of the payment by Thiokol.
26
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1

16.

2

Defendants,

3

$136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal

4

rate from August 24, 1989 until paid in f u l l and P l a i n t i f f ' s

5

costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' f e e s .

Plaintiff

6
7

8
>•

9

10

jointly

is

entitled

to

and s e v e r a l l y ,

judgment
in

the

against

amount

of

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
17.

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
18.

Defendants made impliedly warranted that the tank

was fit for the particular purpose

for which it was

intended.
19.
>> ?l?13
^'

Defendants

breached

the implied warranty of

fitness for a particular purpose by supplying a faulty tank

14

and by failing and refusing to replace the faulty tank after

15

proper notice of the failure was given to Defendants.

16

20.

17

Defendants,

18

$136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal

19

rate*from August 24, 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's

20

costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

21

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

22
23
24

21.

Plaintiff
jointly

is entitled

to judgment

and severally,

against

in the amount of

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
22.

Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to select a

25

competent manufacturer of fiberglass tanks to supply tanks

26

for the Treatment Plant.

27
28

WALSTAD & B A B C O C K A T T O R N E Y S & C O U N S E L O R S AT L A W

1

2

23. Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to adequately
inspect the materials from which the tank was constructed.

3
4

24. Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to adequately
supervise the construction of the tank.

5

25. Defendants negligently performed their duties to

6

Plaintiff and said negligence was a proximate cause of

7

Plaintiffs1 damages as alleged herein.

8

26. As a result of Defendants1 negligence Plaintiff

9

has suffered damages and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment

10

against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of

11

$136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal

12

rate from August 24, 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's

13

costs incurred herein.

14
15

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants,
jointly and severally, as follows:

16

1.

In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest

17

thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until

18

paid

19

including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the First

20

Cause of Action;

21

in

2.

full

and Plaintiff's

costs

incurred herein,

In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest

22

thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until

23

paid

24

including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Second

in

full

and Plaintiff's

costs

incurred herein,

25 || Cause of Action;
26
27
28
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1

3.

In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest

2

thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until

3

paid

4

including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Third

5

Cause of Action;

6

in

4.

full

and

Plaintiff's

costs

incurred

herein,

In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest

7

thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until

8

paid in full and Plaintiff's costs incurred herein pursuant

9

to the Fourth Cause of Action;

10

5.

11

deems proper.

12

For such other and further relief as the Court

DATED this

13

of April, 1990.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

14
15
Robert F*. Babcock
Attorneys for Plaintiff

16
17
18

Plaintiff's Address:
2004 North Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
10.compl.134
26
27
28
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